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NEW LIFE FOR THE "CRITERIA TESTS" IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE:
"GUNWALL IS DEAD-LONG LIVE GUNWALL!"
Hugh D. Spitzer*
ABSTRACT

When state appellate courts in the early 1980's began to rely more
frequently on individual rights provisions of state constitutions, critics
asserted that the use of state constitutions was leading to result-oriented
decisions based on weak jurisprudence. A number of these state courts,
including New Jersey's in State v. Hunt, and then Washington's in State v.
Gunwall, responded with the "criteria" or 'factor" approach to applying
and interpreting state constitutionalprovisions with federal analogs. That
approachwas meant to encourage a more thoughtful, methodical use of state
constitutions. The criteriamethod itself was criticizedfor encouraging overdependence on the FederalConstitution as interpretedby federal courts. But
in Washington State, gradual changes in the composition of its supreme
court led to a shift in how the "Gunwall factors" were used: those criteria
became much less important for deciding whether to apply a state
constitutionalprovision, and more importantfor deciding how to apply such
a provision. At the same time, the court became increasingly comfortable
independently applying the state constitution, moving to a "dual
sovereignty" technique of relying on the state document first, but
simultaneously undertaking a federal analysis. The Gunwall factors evolved
into a checklist for applying multiple interpretive techniques to a specific
constitutional problem. This article observes that the Hunt and Gunwall
*
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criteria reflect traditional methods of interpreting constitutions. For
example, they parallel the six common "modalities of constitutional
argument" described by University of Texas Professor Philip Bobbitt. This
article shows how, for decades, all six have been regularly applied by
Washington's supreme court in addressing questions of constitutional
interpretation.In one recent case, Washington Water Jet Workers Ass'n v.
Yarborough, at least five of Bobbitt's six modalities can be observed. This
article then argues that despite criticism, the factor approach should not be
discarded, but should be embraced, improved upon, and applied as an
interpretive guide to assist state appellate courts in the development of state
constitutionaljurisprudence.
I. INTRODUCTION
For the past twenty years, legal theory about state constitutions has often
been influenced by the "criteria" or "factor" approach, first proposed by New
Jersey Justice Alan Handler's concurring opinion in State v. Hunt and
subsequently adopted by a number of other state high courts, including
Washington's in State v. Gunwall.2 However, the criteria method for
applying and interpreting state constitutions has been frequently criticized in
academic literature by those who view this technique as a barrier to
interpreting state constitutional provisions independently from analogous
language in the United States Constitution.3
This article suggests that the criteria approach has much to offer when it
is detached from the debate over the desirability of independent state
constitutional jurisprudence. In many jurisdictions, including in Washington,
that debate appears settled; one state constitutional provision after another
has been interpreted differently from, or applied differently than, its federal
analog. State high court judges have become comfortable in their role as the
final arbiters of their own basic charters, including the language of
provisions corresponding to the United States Constitution. At the same time,
the criteria method in Washington State has proven to be a useful step-bystep process for briefing and analyzing any state constitutional provision,
regardless of whether that provision has a federal analog. This article
proposes that when the Hunt and Gunwall factors are understood to be like,

1. 450 A.2d 952, 962-69 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring); see infra notes 27-29
and accompanying text (listing Justice Handler's "standards or criteria").
2. 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986); see infra note 30 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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and are applied like, other recognized guides to constitutional analysis such
as Philip Bobbitt's six modalities of constitutional argument,4 they can be
embraced, improved upon, and allowed to make an ongoing contribution to
the development of state constitutional jurisprudence.
II.

WHICH CONSTITUTION? THE RISE OF THE CRITERIA CONTROVERSY

State supreme courts have been interpreting their own constitutions since
each state's early days. Throughout the nineteenth century and until the
growth of the national government during and after the New Deal, the focus
of American constitutional law was at the state level. It has been observed
that nineteenth-century "constitutional law" consisted of a vast array of
decisions about both state constitutions and the Federal Constitution, with
most of those cases coming from state high courts.5 Professor Paul Kahn has
pointed out that Thomas Cooley, the leading constitutional scholar of the late
nineteenth century, "looked to the cases coming from the different state
courts to find the common principles ' 6of state constitutionalism-and,
ultimately, of American constitutionalism.
Washington's supreme court was busy construing the state's new
constitution soon after its 1889 adoption. These decisions included the
construction of provisions of the declaration of rights with close federal
analogs.7 Well into the twentieth century, the Washington Supreme Court
had few reservations about interpreting its own constitution differently from
PHIuP BOBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7-8 (1982)
4.
CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE];
P-BuP BOBBITr,
[hereinafter BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991) [hereinafter BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION].
5.
See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Interpretationand Authority in State Constitutionalism,
106 HARV. L. REv. 1147, 1162-63 (1993); Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the
United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the
Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 28-29 (1989). But see generally G. Alan Tarr, The New
JudicialFederalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1097 (1997).
6.
Kahn, supra note 5,at 1163.
7.
See, e.g., Malim v. Benthien, 196 P. 7, 8-9 (Wash. 1921) (WASH. CONST. art. I, §§
12, 19-privileges or immunities and equal election rights); State ex rel. Dearie v. Frazier,
173 P. 35, 35 (Wash. 1918) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11I-religious freedom); State ex. rel.
Wells v. Dykeman, 127 P. 218, 219 (Wash. 1912) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 4-freedom of
assembly); State ex rel. Carraher v. Graves, 43 P. 376, 377 (Wash. 1896) (WASH. CONST. art.
I, § 22-right to compel and confront witnesses); State ex rel. Repath v. Caldwell, 37 P. 669,
669-71 (Wash. 1894) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22-speedy trial); State v. Coella, 28 P. 28, 3234 (Wash. 1891) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22-impartial jury); State ex rel. Coella v.
Fennimore, 26 P. 807, 807 (Wash. 1891) (Dunbar, J., dissenting) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22rights of the accused).
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the United States Supreme Court's understanding of the Federal Bill of
Rights. For example, in 1949, the court, in Visser v. Nooksack Valley School
District, No. 506,8 expressly declined to follow the Supreme Court's holding
in Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township9 and rejected bus
transportation subsidies for parochial schools; the state court held, despite
Everson, that the Washington Constitution's anti-establishment provisions 0
barred expenditure of public funds for religiously-based education."
State court reticence about diverging from the United States Supreme
Court is a fairly recent development-one that appeared in the 1980's as a
reaction to state court decisions that accorded broader rights to criminal
defendants based on state constitutions. Those rights-protective rulings were
a reaction to the Burger Court's backtracking from a number of the Fourth
Amendment rulings by the predecessor Warren Court.' 2 A notable example
in Washington State was State v. Ringer,13 which involved a warrantless car
search based on the odor of marijuana from the vehicle. The court rejected
Supreme Court decisions that had permitted similar searches under the
Fourth Amendment, and instead based its decision on article 1, section 7 of
the Washington Constitution. 14 The 7-2 decision took an historical approach,
relying on the law of search and seizure as it existed when Washington's
1889 constitution was adopted. A dissent in Ringer asserted that the majority
was "picking and choosing between state and federal constitutions" to reach
a desired result in an unprincipled fashion.' 5 This critique echoed a common

8. 207 P.2d 198 (Wash. 1949).
9. 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947) (holding that the Establishment of Religion Clause of the
First Amendment does not prohibit a general program under which tax-raised funds pay the
bus fares of individuals attending public and other schools).
10. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4.
11. Visser, 207 P.2d at 204-05.
12. Reliance on state constitutions in response to the less rights-protective Burger Court
is often traced to a 1977 article by Justice William Brennan, Jr. See generally William J.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV.
489 (1977). But cf Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our
Time, 54 VA. L. REV. 928, 929-39 (1968) (suggesting earlier roots of the state constitutional
movement); Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New JudicialFederalism's
FirstGeneration, 30 VAL. U. L. REV., at vii, xiv-xv (1996) (same).
13. 674 P.2d 1240 (Wash. 1983), overruled in part by State v. Stroud, 720 P.2d 436
(Wash. 1986).
14. Id. at 1242-43.
15. Id. at 1250 (Dimmick, J., dissenting).
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1980's attack on independent state constitutional
decisions on grounds that
16
reliance on state charters was result-oriented.
A few months after Ringer, the Washington Supreme Court decided
State v. Coe, 17 a free speech case based on the Washington Constitution
rather than the First Amendment. In the majority opinion, Justice Robert
Utter wrote that "[w]hether the prior restraint was constitutionally valid or
invalid should be treated first under our state constitution" because of "the
vast differences between the federal and state constitutions and courts" and
in order to "grant the proper respect to our own legal foundations and fulfill
our sovereign duties."1 8 Justice Utter emphasized the need to "develop a
body of independent jurisprudence that will assist this court and
the bar of
19
our state in understanding how that constitution will be applied."'
The two years following Ringer and Coe brought four new elected
members to Washington's supreme court.20 Three were former prosecutors
and all four had run as conservatives on criminal justice issues. 21 After the
election, it was unclear whether the court would continue to rely on the
state's declaration of rights or would give more deference to United States
Supreme Court opinions. 2222 However, in 1986, in State v. Gunwall, the new
Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed that it would continue to
independently rely on state constitutional sections similar to provisions in the
United States Constitution. But the Gunwall opinion, written by the newly
elected Justice James Andersen, cautioned that "[m]any of the courts now
resorting to state constitutions rather than analogous provisions of the U.S.
Constitution simply announce that their decision is based on the state
constitution but do not further explain it."'23 Justice Andersen proposed "six
nonexclusive neutral criteria... relevant to determining whether, in a given
16. George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No Anchor-Judicial
Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975, 987 (1979); see also
Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEx. L. REv. 995, 1006 (1985).
17. 679 P.2d 353 (Wash. 1984).
18. Id. at 359.
19. Id.
20. Washington State's nonpartisan judges are elected to office. See WASH. CONST. art.
IV, § 3; WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.52.231 (2006).
21. See CHARLES H. SHELDON, THE WASHINGTON HIGH BENCH: A BIOGRAPHICAL
HISTORY OF THE STATE SUPREME COURT, 1889-1991, at 75, 101, 138-40, 164 (1992); see also
OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE, 1984 VOTERS AND CANDIDATES PAMPHLET 34-35 (10th ed.

1984).
22. See ROBERT F. UTrER & HUGH D. SPITzER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITuTION:
A REFERENCE GUIDE 4-8 (2002), for a history of the Washington Supreme Court's evolving
thinking during this period.
23. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811-12 (Wash. 1986).
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situation, the constitution of the State of Washington should be considered as
extending broader rights to its citizens than does the United States
Constitution. 2 4 The Gunwall criteria were written with factors proposed by
New Jersey Justice Alan Handler's concurrence in State v. Hunt25 in hand,
but the Gunwall standards reflect some adjustments.2 6 Handler, who desired
"some consistency and uniformity between the state and federal
governments, 27 had suggested in a concurring opinion in Hunt seven
"standards or criteria for determining when to invoke our State Constitution
' 28
as an independent source for protecting individual rights[:]
(1)textual language;
(2)legislative history;
(3)preexisting state law;
(4) structural differences between the state and federal constitutions;
(5)matters of particular state interest or local concern;
(6) state traditions; and
29
(7)public attitudes.
Justice Andersen's criteria for use in Washington State copied three of
Handler's standards, split one factor into two, created or reconfigured
another factor, and either ignored the other three factors or assumed that they
were subsumed in one or more of Andersen's recommended criteria. The
Gunwall criteria are summarized immediately below and are shown side by
side with Handler's in Appendix I to this Article. Andersen's Gunwall
factors are:
(1) textual language of the state constitution;
(2)significant differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal
and state constitutions;
(3) state constitutional and common law history;
(4) preexisting state law;
(5) differences in structure between the federal and state constitutions; and
(6) matters of particular state interest or local concern.3 °
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 812.
450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982).
See Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 812-13; see also UTTER & SPrrZER, supra note 22, at 7.
Hunt, 450 A.2d at 964 (Handler, J., concurring); see also Alan B. Handler,
Expounding the State Constitution, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 202, 204 (1982).
28. Hunt, 450 A.2d at 965 (Handler, J., concurring). A majority of the New Jersey
Supreme Court adopted Handler's criteria the following year in State v. Williams, 459 A.2d
641, 650 (N.J. 1983).
29. Hunt, 450 A.2d at 965-67 (Handler, J. concurring).
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Handler's version of the standards has been adopted to a greater or lesser
extent by high courts in Delaware,3 ' Pennsylvania,32 Texas,33 and
Connecticut, 34 among others. The Gunwall version of Handler's criteria, on
the other hand, was copied by Wyoming 35 and Michigan. 36 The differences
between Handler's and Andersen's criteria are not as important as are their
similarities and the fact that each urged states to approach their constitutions
cautiously so that state court decisions "will be made for well founded legal
that of duly
reasons and not by merely substituting our notion of justice for
37
Court.9
Supreme
States
United
the
or
elected legislative bodies
The courts adopting the criteria method initially appeared to be taking
what has been labeled an "interstitial" approach to state constitutions, 38 with
the assumption that they would follow the United States Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on similar provisions unless there were gaps ("interstices") or
unless the state constitutions firmly dictated a separate line of reasoning.3 9
Alternate approaches have been labeled "primacy" (state courts should
always consult their own constitutions first),40 "lock-step" (state courts

30. Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 812-13.
31. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 864-65 (Del. 1999).
32. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991).
33. See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Barber, 111 S.W.3d 86, 106 (Tex. 2003).
34. See, e.g., State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225, 1232 (Conn. 1992), abrogatedby State v.
Brocuglio 826 A.2d 145 (Conn. 1998).
35. See, e.g., Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 622 (Wyo. 1993) (Macy, C.J., concurring);
O'Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401, 408 (Wyo. 2005).
36. See, e.g., People v. Goldston, 682 N.W.2d 479,485 (Mich. 2004).
37. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (Wash. 1986).
38. This observation was made soon after the Gunwall decision in Linda White Adkins,
Federalism, Uniformity and the State Constitution-State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d 54, 720
P.2d 808 (1986), 62 WASH. L. REV. 569, 574-75, 582 (1987).
39. See Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment
on Federal ConstitutionalIssues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds,
63 TEx. L. REv. 1025, 1027-31 (1985) [hereinafter Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the
Crocodile] (describing the "interstitial" or "supplemental" approach, together with the other
theories of state and federal constitutional interaction); see also Robert F. Utter & Sanford E.
Pitler, Presenting a State ConstitutionalArgument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20
IND. L. REV. 635, 648-51 (1987); Rachel A. Van Cleave, State ConstitutionalInterpretation
and Methodology, 28 N.M. L. REV. 199, 206-09 (1998). New Mexico provides an example of
a state that has formally adopted the interstitial approach for determining when and how to
apply its constitution independently. See State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 7 (N.M. 1997).
40. See Utter & Pitler, supra note 39, at 647-48.
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should always follow the Supreme Court), 41 and "dual sovereignty" or "dual
reliance" (state courts should simultaneously apply state and federal
constitutions to each case because that leads to the most thoughtful
development of constitutional law and assures the strongest constitutional
protections).42
Whichever theory of state constitutional application is adopted, state
courts seem ambivalent in the employment of the selected theory. Empirical
studies suggest that "primacy" states do not uniformly adhere to their own
constitutions.4 3 During the "interstitial decade" after the Gunwall decision,
Washington State justices often voiced a strong "primacy" commitment to
applying their own constitution first, even if they rarely diverged from the
United States Supreme Court.44 One researcher concluded that during the ten
years after Gunwall, the Washington Supreme Court employed all four
theories of state constitutional interpretation in various criminal cases.45 That
study suggested that the Gunwall criteria had been applied differently by
different judges, depending on the text of the constitutional provision
involved, but also based on each judge's predisposition to the interstitial,
dual sovereignty, lock-step, or primacy approach.46 Another study has
documented how in New Jersey, the source of the criteria method and
ostensibly an "interstitial" state, the state supreme court has applied a variety
of theories in applying the state constitution depending on the constitutional
provision involved. 7
The criteria method has been criticized for a tendency to raise the bar for
application of state constitutions, with the danger that courts using the Hunt
or Gunwall approach will remain overly dependent on the Federal

41. See David M. Skover, State ConstitutionalLaw Interpretation:Out of "Lock-Step"
and Beyond "Reactive" Decisionmaking, 51 MoNT. L. REv. 243, 243-53 (1990) (analyzing
and criticizing the "lock-step" approach); Utter & Pitler, supra note 39, at 645-46.
42. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile,supra note 39, at 1029-30.
43. See generally John W. Shaw, Comment, Principled Interpretations of State
Constitutional Law-Why Don't the 'Primacy' States Practice What They Preach?, 54 U.
PT. L. REv. 1019 (1993). See also Van Cleave, supra note 39, at 217-18.
44. See Hugh D. Spitzer, Which Constitution?Eleven Years of Gunwall in Washington,
21 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 1187, 1196-1204 (1998).
45. Laura L. Silva, State Constitutional Criminal Adjudication in Washington Since
State v. Gunwall: "Articulable, Reasonable and Reasoned" Approach?, 60 ALB. L. REv.
1871, 1880 & n.54 (1997).
46. See id. at 1906-08.
47. William F. Cook, The New Jersey Bill of Rights and a "Similarity Factors"
Analysis, 34 RuTGERs L.J. 1125, 1158 (2003).
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Constitution and render their constitutions "a mere row of shadows. ' '4s
Further, it has been observed that the criteria "are a curious mix of
interpretive and comparative factors ' 49 that have distinct purposes:
comparative factors (such as differences in text and differences in
constitutional structure) to help determine whether to apply a state provision
differently than the United States Supreme Court has applied an analogous
federal provision; and interpretive factors (textual language, history, preexisting law, and matters of local concern) to help determine how to apply
any constitutional provision, state or federal. This is probably due to the fact
that in the mid-1980's and early-1990's, many of these state courts were
unsure about the propriety of applying their constitutions independently of
the United States Constitution, and because for many state constitutional
provisions the courts had not actively contributed to their own independent
jurisprudence for decades. Thus, judges needed comparative factors to justify
independent analysis. But since then, the Washington Supreme Court has
become increasingly comfortable with its own constitution and its growing
body of jurisprudence. During the 1990's and the first five years of the
twenty-first century, what had been comparative factors for deciding whether
to interpret a state provision independently transformed into factors to guide
briefing and to aid the court in determining how much weight to accord
United States Supreme Court decisions. The Washington court has shifted
from the interstitial approach to the dual sovereignty approach, and in doing
so the use of the Gunwall criteria has changed.

48. State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (N.H. 1986) (Souter, J., concurring). New
Jersey Justice Morris Pashman took issue with and critiqued Handler's criteria approach. See
State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 958 (N.J. 1982) (Pashman, J., concurring). Pashman expressed
concerns about devaluing a state's own constitution, history, and jurisprudence, and he argued
that a stronger reliance on state constitutions would strengthen constitutional safeguards
within the federal system. Id. at 960-62. Likewise, academics have critiqued the factor
approach. See, e.g., Dennis J. Braithwaite, An Analysis of the "Divergence Factors": A
Misguided Approach to Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the New Jersey
Constitution, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 31-32 (2001); James W. Talbot, Rethinking Civil Liberties
Under the Washington State Constitution, 66 WASH. L. REv. 1099, 1110-12 (1991); Robert F.
Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy
Problems in Independent State ConstitutionalRights Adjudication, 72 NoTRE DAME L. REV.
1015, 1063 (1997) [hereinafter Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court]; Robert F.
Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court
Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REv. 353, 385-89 (1984) [hereinafter Williams, In the
Supreme Court's Shadow].
49. Talbot, supra note 48, at 1108; see also Van Cleave, supra note 39, at 200.
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III. THE SHIFT IN HoW THE GUNWALL CRITERIA ARE APPLIED

The Gunwall opinion was itself inconsistent about the court's purpose in
adopting the criteria approach. Justice Andersen wrote that the court sought a
basis for determining when "to resort to independent state constitutional
grounds to decide a case, rather than deferring to comparable provisions of
the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court., 50 He asserted that many courts were, without adequate explanation,
relying on state constitutions rather than analogous provisions of the United
States Constitution, adding that "[t]he difficulty with such decisions is that
they establish no principled basis for repudiatingfederal precedent and thus
furnish little or no rational basis for counsel to predict the future course of
state decisional law., 51 Those statements suggest Justice Andersen felt that
federal court decisions had precedential value with respect to a state
constitution, or at least that state high courts should "defer" to federal courts
absent a particularly strong reason to rely on their state charters. 52 But later in
Gunwall, where Justice Andersen formally stated the purposes of the criteria
approach, he emphasized its value to lawyers and judges in the development
of state constitutional jurisprudence and its value as an interpretive tool:
Thus, the foregoing six criteria are aimed at: (1) suggesting to counsel
where briefing might appropriately be directed in cases wherein they are
urging independent state constitutional grounds; and (2) helping to insure
that if this court does use independent state constitutional grounds in a given
situation, it will consider these criteria to the end that our decision will be
made for well founded legal reasons and not by merely substituting our
notion of justice for 5that
of duly elected legislative bodies or the United
3
Court.
Supreme
States

50. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 810 (Wash. 1986) (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 812 (emphasis added).
52. It should be noted that when this author interviewed former Justice Andersen to
discuss the history and context of the Gunwall case and the criteria method, he expressed
surprise that he had used the words "federal precedent" and that he had ever suggested that the
federal court decisions were binding on state supreme courts when an issue involved solely a
state constitutional question. Interview with James A. Andersen, Wash. Supreme Court Justice
(retired), in Seattle, Wash. (July 14, 1997).
53. Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 813 (emphasis added).
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In subsequent opinions, different Washington State justices characterized
the purpose of the Gunwall criteria in markedly different ways, depending on
whether they viewed the factors as a high bar over which lawyers and judges
must leap to gain access to the state constitution, or, alternatively, as a set of
useful interpretive devices to better discern the meaning of a state
constitution that was to be readily applied. These views corresponded to
whether individual judges preferred the "interstitial" approach to state
constitutional provisions (to be relied upon only where there were gaps in the
federal constitution or jurisprudence), or whether they leaned toward the
primacy or dual sovereignty approaches (where the state constitution would
be looked to first, or analyzed simultaneously with the federal constitution).
Justice Utter, who took a primacy stand in State v. Coe,54 came to
support dual sovereignty. Given the advocacy of the criteria method by
backers of the interstitial approach, Utter's push for dual sovereignty may
have been meant to provide an appropriate place for federal jurisprudence
while maintaining the lead role for home-grown doctrines based on text,
history, structure, and other peculiarities of individual state constitutions.
Accordingly, Utter used the Washington Supreme Court's opinion in State v.
Wethered56 to underscore what he viewed as Gunwall's principal function: to
provide interpretive guidelines. In Wethered, the court declined to consider a
state constitutional claim raised by a criminal defendant because his attorney
had not briefed the state constitutional issues using the Gunwall criteria.5 7 In
doing so, Justice Utter, with a nod to primacy, stated that the court "would
normally first consider Wethered's claimed violation of his individual rights
under the provisions of the Washington Constitution., 58 He said that the
initial focus on the state constitution was dictated by Coe in 1984 "to enable
us to create a principled body of state constitutional law.",59 Having identified
Coe as the lodestar, Utter said that "[a]s a further aid to developing a sound
basis for our state constitutional law, in State v. Gunwall... we developed
54. 679 P.2d 353 (Wash. 1984).
55. See Utter, supra note 5,at 46-49; Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile,
supra note 39, at 1041-50. One might characterize Justice Utter's version of dual sovereignty
as "primacy with benefits"; i.e., a state court should first look to its own constitution, but then
evaluate a case under the federal charter in order to help develop national constitutional law
and to ensure that litigants receive the highest constitutional protections available. One of my
students, Adam Ake, has jokingly labeled the dual sovereignty approach as "primacy with
more work."
56. 755 P.2d 797 (Wash. 1988).
57. Id. at 800-01.
58. Id. at 800 (emphasis added).
59. Id. (citation omitted).
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nonexclusive criteria to use as interpretive principles of our state
constitution. 6 °
Justice Utter was attempting to steer Washington's court toward using
the Gunwall criteria as interpretive tools rather than as a magic key to the
walled kingdom of the state constitution. Initially, it was not clear whether
the court would accept his suggested direction. Indeed, Wethered was
repeatedly used as the basis to block access to state constitutional arguments
because lawyers had not adequately briefed the issues using the Gunwall
factors.61 During the eleven years following Gunwall, in thirty-nine cases
where state constitutional issues were fully briefed, the Washington court
reached a different result from federal constitutional analysis only eight
times.6 2
In a 1995 double jeopardy case, State v. Gocken,63 the debate over the
meaning and application of Gunwall broke out in dueling opinions. The lead
opinion was authored by Justice Richard Guy, who was never an enthusiast
for independent application of the state constitution. 64 Justice Guy asserted
that Washington state courts "ha[d] consistently held [that] the double
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment and the double jeopardy clause in
article 1, section 9 are virtually identical., 65 He then marched through the
Gunwall criteria, dismissing the defendant's analysis in five out of six factors
and concluding that those "factors do not support Mr. Gocken's contention
that the state double jeopardy clause provides broader protection to criminal
defendants than the [Flederal [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause." 66 In his
analytical approach, Justice Guy was worlds away from Justice Utter's
assumption that state constitutional analysis takes precedence. Instead,
Justice Guy said that whether the state constitution provides broader
protection than the United States Constitution is determined by the six
Gunwall factors. 67 He assumed that the federal courts' rulings under the
United States Constitution were the starting point, and that a heavy burden
was placed on the party raising a state constitutional argument and on the
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. During the eleven years following Gunwall, 65% of the Washington Supreme Court
cases that cited that case resulted in a decision based on the United States Constitution alone,
in part due to attorneys failing to brief the relevant provision of the Washington State
Declaration of Rights. Spitzer, supra note 44, at 1209.
62. Id. at 1200.
63. 896 P.2d 1267 (Wash. 1995).
64. See Silva, supra note 45, at 1907, 1909 & n.281, 1912 nn.303-04.
65. Gocken, 896 P.2d at 1270-71 (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 1273.
67. Id. at 1270.
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party applying the Gunwall factors to gain access to that argument.68 In a
lively concurring opinion, Justice Barbara Madsen took issue with Justice
Guy's analytical method, charging that he had not only ignored Washington
State's preexisting, independent analysis of double jeopardy, but that he was
treating "Gunwall as a talisman, to be invoked simply because the parties
raise an issue under the state constitution., 69 Mimicking Justice Andersen's
words in Gunwall,70 Justice Madsen declared: "The fact that the parties
present a Gunwall analysis... should not be an open invitation to substitute
our current notion of justice, or the notion currently embraced by the United
States Supreme Court, for that of our predecessors.' She then emphasized:
The 2-pronged aim of Gunwall is to assist this court in assuring (1) adequate
briefing from counsel where a decision based on independent state
constitutional grounds is urged, and (2) that where such independent grounds
the resulting decisions "will be made for well founded legal
are appropriate,
72
reasons."
She wrote, "[I]ndependent state constitutional analysis is lost somewhere
in the ever-shifting shadow of the federal courts which are no less political
and perhaps more so than our own state courts, 73 concluding that the
Washington court should "preference independent resolution of state
constitutional questions under a longstanding body of state law."74
Dissenting Justice Charles Johnson added a warning against the "shifting
sands of federal jurisprudence" and faulting the majority's "notion . . . that
our constitution should be interpreted no differently from the [F]ederal
[C]onstitution. ''T
68. See id. at 1270-73.
69. Id. at 1274 (Madsen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
70. See supra text accompanying note 37.
71. Gocken, 896 P.2d at 1274 (Madsen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
72. Id. (quoting State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986)). Justice Madsen also
warned that state court reliance on federal constitutional law would cause judicial efficiency to
be lost "because every time the Supreme Court changes its mind, this court will be called to
revisit the issue." Id.
73. Id. at 1274-75.
74. Id. at 1275.
75. Id. at 1275-76 (Johnson, J., dissenting). An example of Justice Charles Johnson's
advocacy of dual sovereignty is his opinion in State v. Young, where the court decided a
warrantless search case under article 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, but he
nevertheless evaluated the case under the Fourth Amendment "for the purpose of providing
guidance to other courts on the subject of sense-enhanced surveillance of a home." 867 P.2d
593, 601 (Wash. 1994).
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Although the supporters of the "interstitial" approach to state
constitutional jurisprudence won the battle in the 1995 Gocken case, the dual
sovereignty advocates won the war during the following decade. This was
caused, in part, by changes in court personnel. Two of the justices who sided
with Justice Guy in Gocken had already retired and were serving pro
tempore in that case.76 Justices Durham and Guy, the strongest proponents of
the interstitial approach,7 7 retired in 1999 and 2001, respectively.78 By the
end of 2002, the entire Gocken majority, as well as Justice Utter, had left the
79
court.
They were replaced by new members who, based on the results of
subsequent decisions, appear to subscribe to either the primacy or the dual
sovereignty philosophy of Justices Madsen and Charles Johnson (the only
two remaining members of the Gocken bench). This change was reflected in
an evolving view of how the Gunwall criteria were to be applied.
In the years after Gocken was decided, the Washington Supreme Court
held that because it had thoroughly analyzed article 1, section 7 of the state
constitution in the context of search cases, only two of the Gunwall factors
needed to be used to address factors that are "unique to the context in which
the interpretation question arises. 8 ° In State v. Hendrickson,81 the
Washington court in 1996 analyzed a search case solely under the
Washington Constitution and did not even mention Gunwall except in a
footnote regarding procedure.82 In the 1998 case of State v. White,83 Justice
Charles Johnson proclaimed that the Washington Supreme Court had "often
diverged from the United States Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisdiction [sic]"' 84 in search warrant cases, adding that "in this case we have
an analytical advantage because we know article I, section 7 provides more
76. Justice Andersen and Justice Robert Brachtenbach had both retired at the beginning
of 1995. OFFICE OF THE CLERK, WASH. SUPREME COURT, CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY:
WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT 5 (2005) (on file with author).
77. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
78. OFFICE OF THE CLERK, supra note 76, at 5.
79. Id.
80. State v. Johnson, 909 P.2d 293, 301-02 (Wash. 1996); see also State v. Ferrier, 960
P.2d 927, 930 (Wash. 1998). Justice Durham dissented in Ferrierand in doing so complained
about the new majority's inclination to first address state constitutional issues independently
"rather than deferring to comparable federal constitutional provisions," which Durham
asserted was necessary unless a complete Gunwall analysis provided access to the state
constitution. Ferrier,960 P.2d at 935 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). Justice Guy concurred in his
dissent. Id. at 936.
81. 917 P.2d 563 (Wash. 1996).
82. Id. at 567 n.l.
83. 958 P.2d 982 (Wash. 1998).
84. Id. at 985.
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protection to individuals from searches and seizures than the Fourth
Amendment., 85 Importantly, Justice Johnson wrote: "Once we agree that our
prior cases direct the analysis to be employed in resolving the legal issue, a
Gunwall analysis is no longer helpful or necessary. 86 In a footnote, Justice
Johnson stated that a Gunwall analysis was required "in cases where the
legal principles are not firmly established, and certainly a Gunwall analysis
is helpful in determining the scope of the broader protections provided in
other contexts. 87 Only Chief Justice Durham dissented from Justice
Johnson's approach to GunwalL88
Thus, in a few short years after Gocken, a changed Washington court
adjusted course and accepted Justice Madsen's view that Gunwall was not
meant to be a "talisman, 89 or a key to the magic kingdom of the state
constitution. Likewise, the jurists moved to her position, shared with Justice
Charles Johnson and initially spearheaded by retired Justice Utter, that in
keeping with a primacy or a dual sovereignty approach, Gunwall was to
serve as an interpretive tool to assure better briefing by lawyers and the more
thoughtful development of state constitutional jurisprudence. During an
eleven-year period after Gunwall was decided, Washington's supreme court
had declined to consider state constitutional arguments 108 times for lack of
adequate briefing under the Gunwall criteria. 90 By contrast, however, during
the eight years after that, only two opinions cited Wethered and rejected state
constitutional assertions for lack of briefing under the Gunwall factors. 9 1 The
striking reduction in the number of cases where state constitutional
85. Id. at 986.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 986 n.7 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 987-90 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). Justice Alexander dissented separately
based on the application of article 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution to the facts of
the case. Id. at 990.
89. See State v. Gocken, 896 P.2d 1267, 1274 (Wash. 1995) (Madsen, J.,
concurring in
part, dissenting in part). But see Anderson v. King County, 438 P.3d 963, 972 (Wash. 2006),
where Justice Madsen's lead opinion, signed by only three of the court's nine members, gave
deference to federal equal protection analysis in interpreting Washinton's privileges and
immunities clause (WASH. CONST. art I, § 12). Her interstitial approach in that same-sex
marriage case seems at odds with her advocacy in Gocken of a presumptively independent
analysis of the state's constitution.
90. Spitzer, supra note 44, at 1196-97. The survey period for that study covered June
12, 1986 through June 12, 1997.
91. See State v. Dhaliwal, 79 P.3d 432, 441 (Wash. 2003); State v. Bustamante-Davila,
983 P.2d 590, 597-98 (Wash. 1999). During the same recent eight-year period, six appellate
court decisions rejected state constitutional arguments for lack of Gunwall briefing, compared
with ninety-six rejections during the previous eleven years.

1184

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 37:1 169

arguments were rejected reflects vastly improved briefing as well as a shift in
the court's attitude toward the state constitution.92
When Hunt and Gunwall brought the criteria method into the forefront,
the factor approach had been criticized in academic journals as both
confusing and damaging to the development of independent state
constitutional jurisprudence. 93 Critics urged state courts to drop the criteria
approach as being incompatible with the full respect accorded to state
constitutions under the primacy and dual sovereignty theories of state
constitutional law. 94 But is it necessary to throw out the Hunt and Gunwall
baby with the interstitial bathwater? The answer is "no," because courts are
demonstrating that the criteria method can be an effective tool under both the
primacy and the dual sovereignty approaches. As described below, the
criteria or factor approach can help both attorneys and judges systematically
analyze a challenging question from a variety of angles that courts have
always used, consciously or unconsciously, to evaluate cases.
IV. HUNT, GUNWALL, AND BOBBITT'S SIX MODALITIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ARGUMENT

It is helpful to recognize that factors like the Hunt and Gunwall criteria
did not spring full-grown from the heads of Justices Handler and Andersen.
Instead, those criteria shadow standard techniques that courts have long
applied when debating or determining the meaning of a particular
constitutional provision, regardless of whether state and federal
constitutional provisions are being compared. This is underscored by
matching the Hunt and Gunwall factors to University of Texas Professor
Philip Bobbitt's frequently-cited list of six "modalities" of constitutional
92. The Washington court's increased focus on its state constitution, and the importance
of knowledge about that document among lawyers, is underscored by the permanent inclusion
of a state constitutional law question on the Washington State bar exam, commencing in the
early 1990's. The addition of state constitutional law to the exam was at the suggestion of one
or more members of the Washington Supreme Court. Telephone Interview with Frank V.
Slak, Jr., Former Chair, Wash. State Bar Exam'rs Comm. (March 7, 2006); see also
Washington State Bar Association, The Bar Exam, What are the Test Subjects?,
http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/licensing/barexam.htm#9 (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
93. See Atkins, supra note 38, at 584-86; Braithwaite, supra note 48, at 31-32; Talbot,
supra note 48, at 1110; Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 48, at 1022;
Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow, supra note 48, at 385.
94. See Atkins, supra note 38, at 573-74; Braithwaite, supra note 48, at 31-32; Talbot,
supra note 48, at 1110-12; Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra note 48, at
1063; Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow, supra note 48, at 385-89.
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argument. 95 Bobbitt describes them as six "ways in which legal propositions
are characterized as true from a constitutional point of view." 96 Those
modalities, which can also be thought of as six approaches to constitutional
argument or interpretation, are: (1) textual (looking to the meaning of the
words of a constitution alone, as they would be interpreted by the average
contemporary community member); (2) historical (relying on the intentions
of the framers and ratifiers of a constitution and their forerunners);
(3) structural (inferring rules from the relationships that a constitution creates
among citizens and governments); (4) doctrinal (applying rules generated by
prior court decisions or academic commentary); (5) ethical (deriving rules
from the basic principles or moral commitments of the political ethos that are
embodied in a constitution); and (6) prudential (seeking to wisely balance the
costs and benefits of a particular interpretation or court action, in the context
of political and economic circumstances).97
Professor Bobbitt's modalities of constitutional argument are essentially
the same array of interpretive approaches that we see in the Hunt and
Gunwall factors, i.e., interpretations based on a constitution's: text (Hunt
criterion 1, Gunwall criteria 1 and 2), histoKy (Hunt criterion 2 and Gunwall
criteria 3 and 4), structure (Hunt criterion 4, Gunwall criterion 5), prior
doctrine (Hunt criteria 3 and 6, Gunwall criterion 3), ethical considerations
(Hunt criteria 2 and 6, Gunwall criterion 3), and prudential considerations
(Hunt criteria 5 and 7, Gunwall criterion 6). This can be more easily
95. For a discussion about Bobbit's modalities, see BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE,
supra note 4, at 7-93; BOBBrr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 11-22.
96. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 12. Bobbitt's first
book is dedicated entirely to laying out these six common approaches to constitutional
argument and interpretation and showing how they are used. See generally BOBBrr,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 4.

97. BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 4, at 7-93; BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 11-22. These methodological approaches can be observed in
other formulations for interpreting statutes and constitutions. For example, Justice Stephen
Breyer has recently noted that judges, by "their professional training and experience,"
normally examine the following six factors that also closely compare to Bobbitt's list:
language (textual), history (historical), tradition (ethical), precedent (doctrinal), purpose
(historical and ethical), and consequences (prudential). STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 110 (2005). Breyer's construct does not
appear to include an analogy to the structural approach. In a 1989 law review article, the late
Washington State Supreme Court Justice James M. Dolliver proposed a "four major factor"
approach including text, framers' intent, the climate of the times when constitutional
provisions were adopted, and judicial doctrine prior to adoption. James M. Dolliver,
Condemnation, Credit and Corporationsin Washington: 100 Years of Judicial DecisionsHave the Framers' Views Been Followed?, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 163, 165-68 (1989).
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observed in Appendix I to this Article, which displays the Hunt and Gunwall
criteria side by side with Bobbitt's modalities.
Some judges, on both the federal and state benches, assert in court
opinions, 9 confirmation hearings, 99 or on the campaign trail 1 that they
apply a single philosophy of constitutional interpretation. For example, one
often hears a judicial candidate declare his or her firm commitment to "strict
constructionism" (usually associated with textualism)' °1 or "original intent"
(a component of the historical approach to constitutional interpretation).10 2
But the fact is that appellate courts, as well as individual judges, routinely
draw upon all six of Professor Bobbitt's modalities of constitutional
argument. Judges move back and forth between these interpretive
approaches, consciously or unconsciously, depending on the facts of each
case and the context and nature of the issues presented. When we observe a
court calling upon lawyers to brief constitutional issues using the Hunt or
Gunwall criteria, we see that tribunal asking attorneys to bring each of the
principal interpretive approaches to bear so that judges can more effectively
analyze the case. A cynic might claim that jurists want to view the elephant
in every conceivable way so that they can pick and choose the perspectives
that lead to the result they seek. But that would not be fair, because most
lawyers and judges, most of the time, use most, if not all, of these approaches
to make an effective argument or to come to a legally sound decision.
The use of these multiple interpretive methods is not exclusive to a
formal Hunt or Gunwall analysis in a case where analogous state and federal
constitutional provisions are in play. We can easily identify all of Bobbitt's
modalities being used by the Washington Supreme Court during the past 125
98. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 12 P.3d 1208,
1210 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); Legislative Research Cornm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 914
(Ky. 1984); HTK Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 121 P.3d 1166, 1186
(Wash. 2005).
99. See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, Three Surprises from Alito's Testimony: Surprise Witness,
THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, Jan. 11, 2006, s://ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtmnl?i=w060109
&s=leibOl1106; U.S. SENATE, REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM., JUDGE ALITO-IN His OWN
WORDS (2006), http://rpc.senate.gov/_- files/Janl906AlitoSD.pdf.
100.
See, e.g., GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CENTER, ENvTL. POLICY PROJECT, CHANGING
THE RULES BY CHANGING THE PLAYERS: THE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE IN STATE JUDICIAL

ELECTIONS 18 (2000), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/sjelect/judicial-elections.pdf.
101.
Id.
102. See League of Women Voters of North Carolina, North Carolina Court of
Appeals Seat 1, http://www.lwvnc.org/leagueinfo2004/courtofappealsl.html (quoting Bill
Parker, in his unsuccessful 2004 campaign to unseat North Carolina Court of Appeals Judge
Linda McGee, as saying that he would "rule upon the law as it was meant to be applied,
according to the original intent of the legislature").
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years, including instances in the last twenty years that both do and do not cite
the Gunwall tests. For instance, in a 2004 decision, Grant County Fire
Protection DistrictNo. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 103 the court used four of the
six tests in a case applying the state's privileges and immunities clause. The
court had already decided in an earlier decision in the same case that article I,
section 12 of Washington's constitution was to be interpreted based on its
distinct text, history, doctrines and local interests and concem.1 °4 In another
recent case, Washington Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough,0 5 the
members of that court used at least five of those six interpretive techniques in
their opinions.' °6 Below, we focus on the use of the six modalities operating
in Washington Water Jet Workers Ass'n, and provide additional examples
from other Washington State decisions during the past century.
A. Text
On its face, the textual approach to interpreting constitutions is simple:
members of the court read a provision, and, assuming that the individual
justices' understanding of vocabulary and syntax is relatively similar, the
"plain meaning" is agreed upon and the provision is applied. 1°7 "It is a
cardinal principle of judicial review and interpretation that unambiguous
statutes and constitutional provisions are not subject to interpretation and
construction," Washington Justice Robert Finley intoned in 1952. 108
In Washington Water Jet Workers Ass'n, which held that a prison job
training program violated a constitutional ban on contracting out convict
labor, 1°9 Washington's supreme court gave deference to this common
technique for addressing a constitutional clause: "When interpreting
103.
83 P.3d 419 (Wash. 2004).
104. Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 42 P.3d 394, 408 (Wash. 2002), rev'd on
other grounds on reconsideration,83 P.3d 419 (Wash. 2004).
105. 90 P.3d 42 (Wash. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1120 (2005).
106. See id. at 45-56.
107. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest For the Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 206 (1980).
108. State ex rel. Evans v. Bhd. of Friends, 247 P.2d 787, 794 (Wash. 1952); see also
State ex rel. Anderson v. Chapman, 543 P.2d 229, 230 (Wash. 1975) ("The first rule of
constitutional construction which we should consider is the rule that if a constitutional
provision is plain and unambiguous on its face, then no construction or interpretation is
necessary or permissible.").
109. The Washington Constitution states, in part: "[T]he labor of convicts of this state
shall not be let out by contract to any person, copartnership, company or corporation, and the
legislature shall by law provide for the working of convicts for the benefit of the state."
WASH. CONST. art. II, § 29.
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constitutional provisions, we look first to the plain language of the text and
will accord it its reasonable interpretation."" But whether a constitutional
provision or statute is "plain" and "unambiguous" is in the eye of the
beholder. Even if judges agree that text is the first place to look to understand
a clause's meaning in a specific case, they often disagree on how the text is
to be "plainly" read. Are words to be interpreted the way that the "common
person" today understands them? The way common people understood the
words 125 years ago? The way a constitution's drafters themselves
understood them? For example, in State ex rel. State Capitol Commission v.
Lister,"' the Washington Supreme Court, in 1916, interpreted the word
"debt" in the state's constitution. Justice John Main wrote:
Constitutions being the result of the popular will, the words used therein are
to be understood ordinarily in the sense that such words convey to the
popular mind. The meaning to be given to the language used in such
instruments is that meaning which a man of ordinary prudence and average
intelligence and information would give. Generally speaking, the meaning
given to words by the learned and technical is not to be given to words
appearing in a Constitution. 12
In 1998, Washington Justice Richard Sanders
suggested a different
13
approach to reading text in Gerberdingv. Munro:1
Many of our framers were lawyers and appreciated the nuances of language.
In matters of constitutional construction, courts prefer a construction which
will render every word operative,
rather than one which may make some
4
words idle and nugatory. "1

Even the same judge might apply a different approach to text in different
cases. In the passage from his Gerberding v. Munro dissent quoted above,
Justice Sanders urged a technical and nuanced reading of constitutional
text." 5 In another case, Weden H v. San Juan County, 1 6 he used a different
approach, citing "that self-evident rule of constitutional interpretation which
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass'n, 90 P.3d at 45.
156P. 858 (Wash. 1916).
Id. at 859-60.
949 P.2d 1366 (Wash. 1998).
Id. at 1379 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
See id. at 1378.
958 P.2d 273 (Wash. 1998).
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requires us to construe the constitution by its ordinary language as
understood at the time of its ratification." ' 1 7 Assuming that the language
seems clear enough to the justices, there should be little need to proceed to
more complicated methods of understanding the provision's meaning. But
agreement on the "plain meaning" of a text can be elusive, and the "right"
theory of reading text can be elusive as well.
When judges and lawyers do agree on the same theory about reading
text, there is no guarantee that they will see eye to eye on the meaning of the
words themselves. In State v. Norman," 8 the Washington court wrestled with
a fluke of nineteenth-century surveying. Defendants in a drug possession
case had been arrested just south of the United States-Canadian boundary,
but north of the forty-ninth parallel. Because of mid-nineteenth-century
surveying errors, the boundary had been placed above the parallel that was
meant to demarcate the line between the two countries. 19 Yet in 1889, the
Washington Constitution's drafters expressly placed the state's northem
boundary at the forty-ninth parallel, 120 so the defendants urged that they were
in a federal "no man's land" beyond the jurisdiction of Washington State
courts. The dissent agreed with the defendants' argument that the framers
meant what they said when they referred to the forty-ninth parallel and that
the words "reflect[ed] the framers' intent and [was] not subject to judicial
interpretation.' 12' But the majority opinion upheld the convictions, agreeing
with the prosecution that there were "at least seven different systems for
locating the [forty-ninth] parallel," which created "a latent ambiguity" in an
otherwise obvious term.122
B. History
When language that seems "plain" on its face is opaque in application,
courts quickly move to other interpretive techniques for assistance. In
Washington Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough, Washington's high court
moved first to the historical approach for help when it was unable to reach
consensus on the "plain" meaning of the words. 23 The language was just not
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 296 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
40 P.3d 1161 (Wash. 2002).
Id. at 1166-67.
WASH. CONST. art. XXIV, § 1.

121. Norman, 40 P.3d at 1167.
122. Id. at 1168 n.7.
123. 90 P.3d 42, 45 (Wash. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1120 (2005). In addition,
judges sometimes find that a provision's clear meaning is just too hard to swallow, or they
simply desire to supplement a text-based understanding with another interpretive technique to
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plain enough, so the court decided that it would "also examine the historical
context of the constitutional provision for guidance."' 124 The opinion then
proceeded with a massive treatise on late nineteenth century prison labor, the
political movement to halt the misuse of imprisoned workers, and the
resulting language in federal law and state constitutions on that topic.

25

The

majority concluded that a prison work training program violated
Washington's constitution. 26 The dissent countered with an equally detailed
historical analysis leading to an opposite conclusion. 127 In an earlier case,
Sofie v. FibreboardCorp.,128 the Washington court had also used a heavily
historical approach, stating: "Our basic rule in interpreting article I, section
21 is to look to the right as it existed at the time of the constitution's
adoption in 1889. ''129 Perhaps because Washington State's constitution was
adopted recently enough for there to have been extensive newspaper
coverage of the convention's proceedings, and because other contemporary
sources are available,130 Washington's high court has had a strong tendency
toward an historical approach when interpreting the state's basic
document. 131 In State ex rel. Mason County Logging Co. v. Wiley, 132 the

court said: "Constitutions are to be construed as the people construed them in
their adoption, if possible; and the public history of the times should be
consulted, and should have weight in arriving at that construction."' 133 The
court has also held that when interpreting a constitutional amendment, it may
examine the legislative history and the official voters' pamphlet, as well as
"the extrinsic evidence of the circumstances that gave rise to the
amendment. '134 Numerous decisions, including Washington Water Jet
ensure that the meaning as well as the text make sense. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399,435 (1985).
124. Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass'n, 90 P.3d at 45.
125. Id. at 46-49.
126. Id. at 53.
127. See id. at 58-62 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
128. 771 P.2d 711 (Wash.), amended by 780 P.2d 260 (Wash. 1989).
129. Id. at 716.
130.

Cf G. Alan Taff, Understanding State Constitutions, 65

TEMP.

L. REV. 1169,

1186 (1992) ("[Tlhe more recent the constitutional provision, the more likely that there is an
extensive documentary record ... bearing on its meaning. The greater availability of these
materials... facilitates the discovery of original intent.").
131. See generally Dolliver, supra note 97 (displaying Washington judges' focus on
the historical approach).
132. 31 P.2d 539 (Wash. 1934).
133. Id. at 543 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting People ex
rel. Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499 (1871)).
134. Zachman v. Whirlpool Fin. Corp., 869 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Wash. 1994).
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Workers Ass'n, have recounted the influence of rising nineteenth-century
populism on Washington State's constitution, and have13 5 interpreted
provisions based on the court's understanding of populist aims.

C. Structure
But text, history, and drafters' intent are not the only keys to interpreting
a specific provision. As Judge (and Professor) Richard Posner has observed:
"It is extraordinarily difficult to ascertain the intent of a document drafted
two hundred years ago or . . .even one hundred years ago. The cultural,
political, and even linguistic setting is so altered ....,6 Hence there are still

more tools that judges must use to understand and apply constitutional
provisions, including structure. A constitution's allocation of powers among
branches,137 its rules governing the exercise of power by a branch, 38 and
other basic aspects of a constitution's character, all provide assistance to
interpretation. Structural differences between the federal and state
constitutions is one of the Hunt and Gunwall criteria that is often cited in
decisions that interpret state constitutional provisions differently than federal

135. Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass'n v.Yarbrough, 90 P.3d 42, 50-51 (Wash. 2004),
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1120 (2005); see also Grant County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of
Moses Lake, 83 P.3d 419, 426 (Wash. 2004); Manufactured Housing Communities of Wash.
v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 210-11 (Wash. 2000) (Talmadge, J., dissenting); Gerberding v. Munro,
dissenting).
949 P.2d 1366, 1387 (Wash. 1998) (Sanders, J.,
136. Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. Cn. L. REV.263, 283 (1982).
137. For example, the Washington Constitution provides: "The judicial power of the
state shall be vested in a supreme court, superior courts ... and such inferior courts as the
legislature may provide." WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 1.This expression of separation of powers
has been the touchstone for a number of important Washington state constitutional decisions.
See, e.g., Wash. State Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Reed, 115 P.3d 301, 311 (Wash. 2005); Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 88-89 (Wash. 1978).
138. For example, Washington State constitutional provisions constraining the
legislature's exercise of its powers were enacted to prevent legislative "logrolling" and to keep
the legislature accountable to the public. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19 (providing that any
legislative bill shall contain only one subject, which must be reflected in its title). This
underlying purpose of encouraging public disclosure and public control over elected
legislators has been the analytical basis for a number of decisions and has also affected the
outcome of decisions that were not expressly based on that specific section of the state's
constitution. See, e.g., Wash. State Legislature v. Lowry, 931 P.2d 885, 889-90 (Wash. 1997);
Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. State, 304 P.2d 676, 679 (Wash. 1956); Power, Inc. v. Huntley,
235 P.2d 173, 177 (Wash. 1951); Blaine v. City of Seattle, 114 P. 164, 165 (Wash. 1911).
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analogs. 139 For example, in Grant County Fire Protection DistrictNo. 5 v.
City of Moses Lake, in which the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed its
intention to interpret and apply the state's privileges and immunities clause
differently than the similar provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
opinion stated:
The structural difference between the federal and state constitutions is
apparent. Where the [F]ederal [C]onstitution is a grant of enumerated
powers, the state constitution serves to limit the sovereign power, which
directly lies with the residents and indirectly lies with the elected
representatives.
Therefore, structural differences support an independent
4°
analysis.1

As the court has observed, structural differences between the national and
state constitutions are always present.141 Consequently, the criterion is not
very useful in helping a court decide whether to interpret a Washington
constitutional provision differently than the federal courts interpret similar
sections of, and amendments to, the United States Constitution. But,
regardless of whether or not there is a similar federal provision,
Washington's court does regularly use structural factors in the way Bobbitt
describes (i.e., inferring rules from the relationships that a constitution
creates among citizens and governments) when it decides how to read and
apply specific state constitutional provisions. For example, the simple fact
that the Declaration of Rights is the first section of the state's constitution
has been cited for the proposition that the primary purpose of the document
is to protect individual rights against government intrusion. 142 In Washington
Water Jet Workers Ass'n, proponents of a prison labor program argued
(unsuccessfully) that because the relevant provision of the state constitution
was not located in the Declaration of Rights, "it should not be interpreted to

139. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Mighty Movers, Inc., 96 P.3d 979, 992 (Wash. 2004)
("Ordinary rules of textual and constitutional interpretation, as well as the logic offederalism,
require that meaning be given to the differences in language between the Washington and U.S.
Constitutions, and that even identically worded provisions be interpreted independently ...
(emphasis added) (quoting UTrER & SPrrZER, supra note 22, at 10)).
140. 83 P.3d at 428 (citations omitted).
141. See, e.g., State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 596 (Wash. 1994) ("The fifth Gunwall
factor, structural differences . . . will always point toward pursuing an independent state
constitutional analysis ....
").
See also Braithwaite, supra note 48, at 38.
142. State v. Schelin, 55 P.3d 632, 648 (Wash. 2002) (Sanders, J., dissenting).
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protect the interest of free labor or business."' 143 Separation of powers, and
checks and balances between the legislative and judicial branches, 44 and
between the executive and legislative branches, 145 has been a recurring theme
in decisions. For example, in Washington State Legislature v. Lowry, 146 a
case involving the veto power, the court's opinion spoke of the need to
prevent the legislature from using appropriations bills "to derive political
advantage against the executive, thereby upsetting the constitutional
framework of checks and balances."' 147 Other opinions have relied upon the
fact that Washington's constitution divides power within the executive
branch among 4a8 number of independently elected officials with different
assigned tasks. 1
D. Doctrine
The doctrinal approach to determining the meaning of a particular
constitutional clause requires examination of the rules generated by prior
court decisions and commentary, and their application to the case at hand. In
our common law system, judicial decisions based on precedent and the
reasoning of sister courts, is the most commonly used method of interpreting
constitutional provisions when the text is not sufficiently clear. 149 For
example, in Washington Water Jet Workers Ass'n, the court devoted long
sections to evaluating case law from California, Illinois, and many other
states.150 Accepted doctrine leads to judges applying the rule of stare decisis,
143. Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough, 90 P.3d 42, 49 n.6 (Wash. 2004),
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1120 (2005); see also Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat'l Democratic
Policy Comm., 780 P.2d 1282, 1296 (Wash. 1989) (Utter, J., concurring) ("[The] reasons
inherent to the structure of our state constitution argue against a generalized state action
requirement in state constitutional jurisprudence.").
144. See, e.g., In re Salary of Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d 163, 169-71 (Wash. 1976)
(noting that courts have inherent power to intervene in the operation of the other branches, and
also have inherent power to compel funding if lack of resources threaten its ability to carry out
its basic functions).
145. See, e.g., Young v. State, 54 P. 36, 37 (Wash. 1898).
146. 931 P.2d 885 (Wash. 1997).
147. Id. at 896; see also Wash. State Motorcycle Dealers Ass'n v. State, 763 P.2d 442,
446 (Wash. 1988).
148. State v. Sponburgh, 525 P.2d 238, 244 (Wash. 1974) (Hale, J., concurring).
149. Washington courts have turned not only to sister states for assistance in
interpretation, but also to other common law jurisdictions such as England and Canada. See,
e.g., Zvolis v. Condos, 352 P.2d 809, 813 (Wdsh. 1960); Spangler v. Tyler (In re Tyler's
Estate), 250 P. 456, 458-59 (Wash. 1926).
150. Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough, 90 P.3d 42, 53-58 (Wash. 2004),
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1120 (2005).
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even when they disagree with the earlier and controlling decision. 151
Advocates of dual sovereignty, such as Washington's retired Justice Utter,
assert that the doctrinal study and application of both federal and state court
decisions not only assist a state court in understanding a specific provision,
but also contribute
to the development of national constitutional
15 2
jurisprudence.
E. Ethical Perspective

This analytical approach focuses on basic moral and ethical
commitments of a political culture that are entrenched in a constitution. In a
thoughtful application of Bobbitt's ethical mode to state constitutional
interpretation, Emory University Professor Robert Schapiro has observed:
"When the people set forth ideals ...

in broadly worded constitutional text,

they create an overall system of principles that invites interpretation by
reference to the larger value structure that the constitution creates. 153 For
example, in Washington Water Jet Workers Ass'n, the majority opinion drew
upon some of the basic political and philosophical underpinnings of the state

151.
See, e.g., CLEAN v. City of Spokane, 947 P.2d 1169, 1179-80 (Wash. 1997)
(Sanders, J., concurring). Justice Sanders wrote:
Reluctantly I concur with the majority .... But this result is compelled by the
majority decision in CLEAN v. State, wherein this court virtually repealed the
citizens' constitutional right to referendum by allowing the Legislature to inoculate
itself against referendums through conclusory emergency clauses not subject to
meaningful judicial review, as well as King County v. Taxpayers of King County,
which emasculated Const. art. VIII, § 7's prohibition against gifts of public funds to
private persons by adopting a "legally sufficient" consideration test. As my objections
to both decisions were stated for naught in the accompanying dissents, I concur this
case is within the four corners of those majorities and agree stare decisis requires like
result in all other cases unless or until these decisions are appropriately overruled to
restore that measure of constitutional protection our citizens are justly entitled.
Id. (Sanders, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
152. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile, supra note 39; see also Kahn,
supra note 5, at 1167-68; State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 601 (Wash. 1994).
153.
Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretationin State Constitutional Law, 84
VA. L. REv. 389, 453 (1998); see also Cornell W. Clayton, Toward a Theory of the
Washington Constitution, 37 GONZ. L. REv. 41, 88 (2001) ("[Q]uestions of interpretive
legitimacy must always be resolved by appeals to a theory of the substantive values of the
constitution.").

2006]

NEW LIFE FOR THE "CRITERIA TESTS"

1195

constitution in explaining the meaning of the prison labor contracting
clause.154 The court stated:
Central among the populist ideals was the protection of the individual from
unfair advantages created by coalitions between big government and
politically connected big businesses. The populists wished to protect
personal, political, and economic rights from both the government and [big]
corporations, and they strove to place strict limitations on the powers of both.
To achieve this, the populists strove to erect a fire wall between the public
and private sectors. 155
The quoted section is more than an example of the historical interpretative
method. It is an "ethical" approach because it digs deeper, into the
underlying political ethos that the framers built into a basic document that
was then approved by the voters. This includes what the late Washington
Justice James M. Dolliver called "the atmosphere or temper of the times
surrounding the constitutional convention."' 5 Other frequent examples of
basic moral and ethical commitments entrenched in Washington State's
constitution include the state supreme court's recognition of the fundamental
159
157
private property, 158 sexual equality,
importance of personal privacy,

154. 90 P.3d at 50; see also Grant County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake,
42 P.3d 394, 407 (Wash. 2002) ("[Tlhe reference to corporations in our state constitution
reflects concerns by the framers regarding undue political influence exercised by those with
large concentrations of wealth ....
"),vacated in part on reh'g, 83 P.3d 419 (Wash. 2004).
155. Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass'n, 90 P.3d at 50 (alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Dolliver, supra note 97, at 166. As former Oregon State Supreme Court Justice
(and Professor) Hans Linde has observed, a constitution is a record of political action as well
as a document to interpret. Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions are Not Common Law:
Comments on Gardner'sFailed Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927, 929-31 (1993).
157. See, e.g., State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 932-34 (Wash. 1998) (requiring police
without warrant to expressly state homeowner's right to refuse officer's entry); State v.
Young, 867 P.2d 593, 596-98 (Wash. 1994) (holding that the use of an infrared thermal device
violates defendant's privacy rights, noting that WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 "clearly recognizes an
individual's right to privacy with no express limitations" (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting State v. Simpson, 622 P.2d 1199, 1205 (Wash. 1980))); State v. Boland, 800 P.2d
1112, 1114-16 (Wash. 1990) (finding a privacy right in garbage).
158. See, e.g., Manufactured Housing Communities v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 189 (Wash.
2000) (noting the framers' strong concern about protecting private property from
governmental taking or interference).
159. See, e.g., Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, 892-93 (Wash. 1975) (requiring
admission of young women onto football team, and emphasizing overriding and compelling
interest in equal rights entrenched by equal rights amendment to state constitution).
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universal education, 16° and the separation of church and state while
1 61
vigorously protecting personal religious freedoms.
F. Prudential
Judges often balance the social, economic, and/or political costs and
benefits of a particular understanding of a constitutional provision. Some
theorists, notably Judge Richard A. Posner, argue that a pragmatic approach
to interpreting and applying constitutional provisions is a positive good. 162 A
number of United States Supreme Court justices (e.g., Holmes and
Frankfurter) have, in deciding cases, explicitly applied "balancing tests" and
openly taken into account practical considerations, a concern about
outcomes, and the need to accommodate competing social forces within
society. 163 Posner notes that Justice Robert Jackson, who "had a rich
background of involvement in high-level political questions, was not bashful
in drawing upon his extrajudicial experience for guidance to the content of
constitutional doctrine." 164 In his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure),1 65 Justice Jackson provided a classic example
of the prudential approach:
160. See, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 83-86 (Wash. 1978)
(holding that public K-12 education "is the paramount duty of the state" (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting WASH. CONST. art 9, § 1)).
161.
See, e.g., First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 187
(Wash. 1992) (emphasizing freedom of conscience and holding that application of historical
preservation laws to church structures constitutes impermissible government intrusion into
liturgy); Witters v. Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1130-31 (Wash. 1989) (Utter, J.,
dissenting) (noting 1889 newspaper editorial warning that religious instruction "means a
gradual retrogression to the union of church and state, and this union means a tyrannical
government and a corrupt priesthood"); Weiss v. Bruno, 509 P.2d 973, 978 (Wash. 1973)
(emphasizing "absolute" constitutional prohibition on use of public funds for religious
education), overruledby State ex rel. Gallwey v. Grimm, 48 P.3d 274 (Wash. 2002).
162. See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3-4
(1996) [hereinafter Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication]; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 13 (2003) ("[T]he pragmatic judge aims at the decision that is
most reasonable, all things considered, where 'all things' include both case-specific and
systemic consequences, in their broadest sense ....
").
163.
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 952-63 (1987); Morton J. Horwitz, Holmes in American Legal Thought, in THE
LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 31, 56-57 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992); FELiX
FRANKFURTER, The Judicial Process and the Supreme Court, in OF LAW AND MEN: PAPERS
AND ADDRESSES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 31, 39 (Philip Elman ed., 1956).
164. Posner, PragmaticAdjudication, supra note 162, at 10.
165. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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That comprehensive and undefined presidential powers hold both practical
advantages and grave dangers for the country will impress anyone who has
served as legal advisor to a President in time of transition and public anxiety.
While an interval of detached reflection may temper teachings of that
experience, they probably are a more realistic influence on my views than the
conventional materials of166
judicial decision which seem unduly to accentuate
doctrine and legal fiction.
Bobbitt describes the prudential approach as a "constitutional argument
which is accentuated by the political and economic circumstances
surrounding the decision. Thus prudentialists generally hold that in times of
national emergency even the plainest of constitutional limitation can be
ignored." 167 However, it is rare to find the prudential method of
interpretation being expressly applied in a Washington Supreme Court
decision, perhaps because the court's commitment to strong (sometimes
"absolute") rights protections 68 makes it hesitant to balance individual
liberties against the power of government. 169 For example, the prudential
approach does not make an appearance in Washington Water Jet Workers
Ass'n, a case that involved rights of both prisoners and free workers.
Furthermore, the Washington court actively defers to the Washington
legislature in policy matters, and has often declined to "fix" statutory or
constitutional problems. Thus, in State ex rel. Washington Toll Bridge
Authority v. Yelle, 70 the state supreme court rejected a statute permitting
state acquisition of private ferries because the legislation covered multiple
subjects in violation of a constitutional prohibition. The opinion stated:
A wholesome statute, if declaratory of a subject not within the title, must fall
before it, for it is general in its application. While it is intended as a guard
against the bad in legislation, it is also intended as a herald of the true intent
and purpose of the law. It is not within the power of the courts to declare a
law which is passed in contravention of this mandate wholesome because it
166.
167.

Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).

BOBBIrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 4, at 61.
168. E.g., Weiss v. Bruno, 509 P.2d 973, 978 (Wash. 1973), overruled in part by State
ex rel. Gallwey v. Grimm, 48 P.3d 274 (Wash. 2002).
169. See, e.g., In re Request of Rosier, 717 P.2d 1353, 1358-59 (Wash. 1986),
superseded by statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.330 (1987), as recognized in Progressive
Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Univ. of Wash., 884 P.2d 592, 601 (Wash. 1994), recodifted as
WASH. REv. CODE §

170.

42.56.040 (2005).

200 P.2d 467 (Wash. 1948).
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is so. If this power were exercised, it would result in a direct violation of the
constitutional mandate and a usurpation of the functions of the Legislature on
the part of the courts. Laws would be sustained or defeated by17 considerations
of present policy rather than by reference to the Constitution. 1
Notwithstanding the state supreme court's reluctance to balance policy
concerns that are better left to legislators, practical considerations are rarely
far away when judges are faced with a controversial case. The prudential
approach does appear from time to time in opinions. For example, Justice
Stephen J. Chadwick, one of the court's most sophisticated jurists, used a
classic prudential method in State v. Mountain Timber Co.,1 72 a 1913 case
upholding industrial insurance legislation against a challenge on substantive
due process grounds. Justice Chadwick wrote:
The police power which may be invoked to protect the health, property,
welfare, and morals, of citizens is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, the
exercise of which is necessary to secure good government and promote the
public welfare. Circumstances and occasions calling for its exercise have
multiplied with marvelous rapidity in recent years, by reason of the wellrecognized fact that modem, social, and economic conditions have called
into existence agencies previously unknown, many of which so vitally affect
the health and physical condition of laborers, and especially female laborers,
that legislation of the character here involved has been sustained with greater
liberality than was formerly evinced under less exacting conditions.

The scope of the police power is to be measured by the legislative will of
the people upon questions of public concern, not in acts passed in response to
sporadic impulses or exuberant displays of emotion, but in those enacted in
affirmance of established usage or of such standards of morality and
expediency as have by gradual processes and accepted reason become so
...

171. Id. at 473 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Arnold v.
Mitchell, 104 P. 791 (Wash. 1909)); see also In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 182
(Wash. 2005) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (stating that an unambiguous statute is subject to a
judicial interpretation of legislative intent and the statute's purpose), cert. denied, Britain v.
Carvin, 126 S. Ct. 2021 (2006); State ex rel. State Capitol Comm'n v. Lister, 156 P. 858, 85960 (Wash. 1916).
172. 135 P. 645 (Wash. 1913).
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fixed as to fairly indicate the better73 will of the people in their social,
industrial, and political development. 1
In Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. State Department of Ecology, 174 a more
recent case involving the application of the police power to the use of private
property, the court again engaged in a formal balancing act, stating:
There is no single, simple test to use in dealing with the taking issue. The
court, guided by broad general principles, must decide each case on its own
The question essentially is one of social policy which requires the
facts ....
balancing of the public interest in regulating the use of private property
not to be encumbered by
against the interests of private landowners
175
restrictions on the use of their property.
V. CONCLUSION: APPLYING ALL AVAILABLE METHODS, ALL THE TIME
Although individual jurists may on occasion state a preference for one
method of constitutional interpretation over another, the fact is that most
courts use any or all of the available approaches to help them understand and
apply specific provisions. In its request that lawyers use the State v. Gunwall
factors to help brief constitutional cases, and in its members' use of those
criteria in its opinions, the Washington Supreme Court has explicitly
recognized the usefulness of viewing the state constitutional elephant from
all points of view. By shifting its focus from using the Gunwall tests as
barriers to be overcome when independently interpreting the state
constitution, to using those criteria principally as briefing and interpretive
devices, the court has given new life and utility to the "criteria" or "factor"
approach first proposed in 1982 by New Jersey Justice Alan Handler in State
v. Hunt.'76
The criteria approach has been criticized for mixing comparative and
interpretive factors and for denigrating the importance of state

173. Id. at 648-49 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Somerville, 122
P. 324, 326 (Wash. 1912)).
174. 565 P.2d 1162 (Wash. 1977).
175. Id. at 1164. For other examples of cases that consciously balanced the public's
need for governmental regulation against individual property rights, see Presbytery of Seattle
v. King County, 787 P.2d 907, 912-13 (Wash. 1990); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062,
1077-78 (Wash. 1987).
176. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
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constitutions. 177 But when courts such as Washington's use the Hunt and
Gunwall factors as checklists to ensure that attorneys argue (and the court
evaluates) difficult constitutional questions from all angles, they are
methodically using interpretive techniques that scholars such as Philip
Bobbitt have shown to have been applied by judges for decades. The Hunt
and Gunwall factors should not be limited to cases in which the court has a
choice of following federal court decisions. Instead, lawyers should formally
be asked to analyze all novel interpretive issues by application of the Hunt or
Gunwall criteria. This will improve the quality and usefulness of briefing and
help courts make more informed and thoughtful decisions. Furthermore,
when the Hunt and Gunwall factors are no longer used as hurdles to
application of a state constitution when there is a federal analog, the
"problem" of mixing comparative and interpretive factors dissolves. The
activity of comparing a state constitutional provision to a similar section of
the United States Constitution, another state constitution, or even the
constitution of another country, is a key component of the doctrinal method
of interpretation and may also be part of applying the structural and ethical
approaches. Put another way, to a state appellate court interpreting its own
constitution, United States Supreme Court decisions about the Constitution
simply represent another source of doctrine--often a useful source-to
consider when the state judges are engaged in construing their jurisdiction's
basic charter.
Consequently, state appellate courts should not jettison the "criteria" or
"factor" approach, as some have suggested. Instead, those courts should ask
lawyers to follow the criteria in their briefing, and should continue to apply
those factors in all challenging interpretive situations, regardless of whether
or not the provision concerned is similar to a section of the United States
Constitution. Those courts should also continue to refine the criteria so that
they become even more useful. For example, the Washington court might
consider collapsing the first two textual factors into one, and adding the
"public attitudes" criterion from the Hunt list or adding a "balancing"
criterion (thus making explicit two prudential factors that have been used in
practice but not formally recognized). By continuing to improve upon their
interpretive methods, appellate courts will carry out their responsibilities
more effectively and will be better able to sustain the constitutions and the
communities they are pledged to serve.

177.

See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX I
COMPARING THE HUNT AND GUNWALL CRITERIA
TO BOBB1TT'S INTERPRETIVE MODALITIES

State v. Hunt

State v. Gunwall

Bobbitt's Modalitiesof
Constitutional
Argument

1. Textual Language

1. Textual

2. Significant
Differences in Texts

1. Textual

3. State Constitutional
and Common Law
History

2. Historical

3. Preexisting State
Law

4. Preexisting State
Law

4. Doctrinal

4. Structural
Differences Between
Federal and State
Constitutions

5. Structural
Differences between
Federal and State
Constitutions

3. Structural

5. Matters of Particular
State Interest or
Local Concern

6. Matters of Particular
State Interest or
Local Concern

6. Prudential

6. State Traditions

3. State Constitutional
and Common Law
History

5. Ethical

1.Textual Language

2. Legislative History

7. Public Attitudes

5. Ethical

4. Doctrinal
6. Prudential

